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ABSTRACT
This paper explores Britain's and the United States'

relationship with the Middle East, as specific examples of
the theory of imperialism.

The economic theory of

imperialism, as understood by Marxian theoreticians and
specifically Harry Magdoff, is used to explain these
relationships. It is shown that the history of both
Britain's and the United States' involvement in the Middle

East conforms to the patterns outlined in the Marxian

theory of imperialism.

The economic motivations for

Britain's involvement in the Middle East are shown to be

similar to those of the United States' involvement, and
both of these are consistent with the theory of

imperialism.

In addition, it is shown that, consistent

with the Marxian theory of imperialism, Iraq's political

economic dependence on the United States prevents it from
achieving the kind of autonomous development and democracy
extolled in the official rhetoric of contemporary U.S.

policy.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

I will be relying on Harry Magdoff's theory of

imperialism to explain the relationship between Great
Britain, the United States, and the Middle East.

The

nature of imperialism has changed over time from that of
the overt colonialism which European powers practiced from

the late 15th century until the 19th century, and in some

cases the 20th century, to the much more covert form of
economic domination which core imperial powers, such as the
United States, now exercise over peripheral nations. The

history of Great Britain and the United States in the

Middle East conforms to the classic Marxian theory of
imperialism; and the latter theory explains the economic
motivations for Britain's and the United States'

involvement in the Middle East, while predicting the
emergence of dependent political economic structures among
peripheral nations, such as Iraq.

Imperialism is a mechanism by which a dominant power

is able to control the trade, investment, labor, and
natural resources of other peoples.

It can take different

forms in different stages of capitalist development and
1

evolves out of the need for profits on the part of
capitalists and corporations (Tabb 2007).

This need for

profits motivates the capitalist and/or corporation in the
dominant nation to seek business opportunities in foreign,
peripheral nations.

And the need to ensure a flow of

profits from these foreign investment opportunities
motivates capitalists to create political economic
relationships, in both the dominant and peripheral nation,
that help bring this about.

Western capitalist powers have

had relations with the Middle East of an imperialist nature

since before the 20th century because of its strategic

location and abundant supplies of natural resources,
specifically oil.

What's more this relationship has led to

the creation of political economic structures that prevent

many nations of the Middle East from achieving autonomous
economic growth and democracy.

Western interest in the Middle East began long before
the discovery of oil in the region.

During the period of

the Ottoman Empire from the early 1800's various trade

agreements were established between European governments
and the Ottoman Empire for the purpose of securing markets
for European investors.

As Britain expanded it's global

empire, the Middle East became an increasingly important
2

region; providing it with land access to India and a

strategic location from which to defend it's Asian
dependencies.

With the discovery of oil in the region

British interests increased as their economy transitioned
to being fueled by oil rather than coal. As other

industrial nations followed, control of the petroleum

resources in the region intensified the intervention in the
region.

In the post World War I era the U.S. became

involved in the petroleum industry of the Middle East, and

following World War II that involvement increased even
more. The history of British and U.S. involvement in the

Middle East is outlined to show that western involvement in
the Middle East is not new and that it conforms to the

Marxian theory of imperialism.

The British involvement in

the region from 1918 to 1925 is compared to U.S.

involvement there from 2003 to present.

The similarities

in the political and economic motivations of the British

and the U.S. for involvement in the region are examined, as

well as the political and economic structures that evolved
as a result of these relationships.

The dominant classes

within the Middle East have played a role in maintaining
the imperial relations with the capitalist powers due to

the benefits these relationships bring to them.
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However,

the continuation of the relationship has led to a lack of
democracy and autonomous economic development.

4

CHAPTER TWO

IMPERIALISM AS A STAGE OF CAPITALISM DEFINED

In this chapter I will discuss imperialism, including
the role of the state and the importance of the export of

capital in this stage of capitalism, as well as the causes
and conditions that give way to this stage in capitalist

development, as explained in the works of Harry Magdoff.
Magdoff has summarized the stages of capitalism, and as

William Tabb points out in his article "Imperialism: In

Tribute to Harry Magdoff", this summary provides a useful
guide for how ongoing technological advancements and

changes in government policies and practices influence
imperialism and the global order. Tabb states in his
article that Magdoff's summary of the stages of capitalism

has,

.

.

.explained the global transitions: from

direct robbery, looting, plunder, and piracy in
the first wave of European overseas expansion at
the end of the fifteenth century; through the

domination of commercial capital from the
seventeenth to the late eighteenth century; to
global intercapitalist rivalry, the rise of
5

industrial capital, and the new imperialism; and
then to the stage of decolonization and the rise

of the multinational corporation." (Tabb 2007)
Imperialism can be summarized as a phase in the development
of world economy in which several advanced capitalist
countries are competing in the world market for industrial

products, monopoly capital is the dominant form of capital,
and the accumulation process has reached such maturity that

capital export is an outstanding feature of world economic

relations (Sweezy in Chilcote 2000, p. 33).

As a

consequence of these basic economic conditions, two further
characteristics have developed- severe rivalry in the world

market leading to international monopoly and the
territorial division of the world among major capitalist

powers (Sweezy in Chilcote 2000, p. 33).
Magdoff described neocolonialism as,

.

.

.the existence of considerable foreign

direction over a nominally independent nation. In
its narrowest sense, this means a high degree of

influence over a country's economic affairs and
economic policy by an outside nation or foreign

business interests, usually entailing influence
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over political and military policy as well. In

addition, the term is used to suggest the
predominance of the culture and values of the

former colonial powers.

(Magdoff 1978, p. 73)

The present period of imperialism is moving beyond

neocolonialism to a more complete integration of peripheral

states into the world economy (Tabb 2007).

Under

imperialism today, an area doesn't necessarily have to be a
formal colony, but instead economic domination takes place.
The domination occurs as a result of the dependence of the

peripheral nation upon the core nation.

This domination

can exist in the form of a peripheral nation's dependence

on the revenues generated from the sale of its few export

products to a single core nation.

It can also exist in the

form of a peripheral nation's dependency on loans made

available to them by a core nation, and the export of
capital, which permits the core nation to receive interest
and profits, thereby increasing their domestic surplus and

strengthening their control over the economy of the

peripheral nation.

For the dependent nation, these

relations represent an export of profits and interest,
which removes part of the surplus generated domestically
and leads to a loss of control over their productive

7
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resources.

Additionally, multinational corporations invest

in industries in the peripheral nation, causing the

industries to become dependent upon the technology and
continued investment by these corporations in order to

modernize and expand production (Dos Santos in Chilcote

2000, p. 272-274).
The competition that develops between the capitalist

powers is balanced with the desire to create order and
harmony over large territory for the purpose of economic

Thus the capitalist states are not just looking to

gain.

receive tribute from a colonized territory, as in earlier

examples of imperialism, but instead are seeking to

organize the socio-economic life of the new territory to
the benefit of the imperial state (Biel 2000, p. 8) .

Capitalist expansion is what propels the geographic
extension of the economic system to new regions of the

world.

Once capitalism has expanded into a region, if that

region is not capitalist already, the imperial nation seeks

to transform the economies in the region away from its

traditional pre-capitalist arrangement into capitalism.
This is done in order for the new area to be receptive to

capitalist expansion, which will benefit the imperial
nation (Howard and King in Chilcote 1999, p. 24).
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This is

done through the assertion of modernization and all of its

supposed benefits for the colonized region.

Magdoff tells us that imperialism would not have been
possible without the prior phase of colonialism, and that

colonialism actually helped to establish the conditions

necessary for imperialism to flourish.
Colonialism, considered as the direct application
of military and political force, was essential to

reshape the social and economic institutions of

many of the dependent countries to the needs of
the metropolitan centers.

Once this reshaping

had been accomplished, economic forces- the
international price, marketing, and financial
systems- were by themselves sufficient to

perpetuate and indeed intensify the relationship
of dominance and exploitation between mother

(Magdoff 2003, p. 109)

country and colony.

Some countries, however, which already have suitable social
and economic institutions come under the economic

domination of capitalist powers without ever going through
the colonial phase (Magdoff 2003, p. 109).

Once colonies are integrated into the circuits of

capitalist exchange there becomes less of an incentive for
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the core nation to maintain external political control and

imperialist domination can take on the form of extra-

economic or economic means of control (Howard and King in
Chilcote 1999, p. 31) .

Extra-economic mechanisms of

control which may be utilized by the core nation include
military threat or occupation, providing military or

economic aid, or constructing a network of military bases

abroad.

Economic control may be in the form of loans from

core nations, and business firms making investments in the

periphery.

These forms of economic imperialism are

referred to as characteristics under finance capital or the

export of capital.
Magdoff offers an explanation as to why there is an
upsurge of capital exports by core nations associated with
modern imperialism. Magdoff writes, that "the tie between

the export of capital and imperialist expansion is the

obvious need of investors of capital for a safe and

friendly environment" (Magdoff 2003, p. 95).

When there is

more than one industrialized state, a rivalry is created in
foreign trade and this rivalry results in competition for

preferential markets. This rivalry between core nations is
a motivation for them to invest abroad.

10

The desire to control pricing by large firms makes the

ownership of raw materials of primary importance.

Advanced

capitalism is based upon industries which require

substantial new supplies of raw materials, such as oil.
Oil requires not only large amounts of capital for

exploration and development of foreign sources, but also
loan capital to enable peripheral nations which contain

these sources to construct the needed transportation and

public utility facilities.

With the maturation of

financial institutions comes the means for mobilizing
capital more easily.

As giant corporations emerge, their

ability and desire to control markets provides a major

incentive for the expansion of capital abroad (Magdoff
2003, p.95).

Magdoff writes,

The impetus to invest abroad arises out of the
competitive struggle among giant corporations.

The ownership of raw materials is of strategic

importance in the push for the control over
process and the need to control and expand

markets is a major spur and incentive for capital
export.

(Magdoff 2003, p. 103)

The increase in the export of capital in the form of direct

investment in and loans to the peripheral nations is
11

another way for core nations to maintain influence and

domination over the economies and politics of those
peripheral states.
Periphery nations are able to build up and improve

upon their infrastructure from the investments and loans

being made in the imperialist phase.

However, because the

base for these investments lies within the core nation, the

economic benefits are brought back to the core nation
rather than remaining within the periphery nation to be

reinvested for growth.

Additionally, foreign contractors

are often hired for these projects paid for by the loans

and investment funds from core nations.

Therefore the

loans end up as income to the core nations in two ways:
first through the direct flow of money that comes back to

them when the contractors are paid for out of the loan
money; and secondly in the form of interest payments, which
the peripheral nation makes to the core nation lenders. The

core nation benefits immensely from this relationship and
will use the persuasive diplomatic or military power of its
state to influence the periphery nation into political and

economic decisions favorable itself (Howard and King in
Chilcote 1999, p. 31+).

This is how new imperialist

relationships utilizing economic domination arise under the
12

new imperialism of the twentieth and twenty-first

This form of economic domination, enforced and

centuries.

continued through use the persuasive diplomatic and
military power of its. state, has been typical of British
and U.S. policy in the Middle East.
The subjugated nation's political and social power
structure helps to sustain the imperialist relations once

established there.

Imperial powers may seek to transform

the traditional economic arrangements in an area to better

suit their need for capital expansion, but they will also

utilize the class system in place for their benefit.
"Imperialism is unwilling to reform the land system because
its rule typically depends upon the support of the colonial
landlord class, both native and foreign" (Sweezy in
Chilcote 2000, p. 43).

There is a class of people in the

subjugated area who benefit from the imperial relationship,
and therefore will work with the capitalist power in order

to perpetuate the economic and political’ arrangements under
imperialism.

In the most general terms, there are three

constituents of the ruling class in these
countries: large landowners, business groups
whose affairs are interrelated with foreign
13

business interests, and businessmen with few or

no ties to the foreign business community...none of
them has a strong motive to sponsor the kind of

structural economic changes that would be

required for an independent economy.

(Magdoff

2003, p. Ill)
Therefore, the classes within the society of the subjugated

nation who profit from the imperialist relations do little
to nothing to reform the government or economy of their

nation in order to remove the imperial power from influence
there because they benefit from the continuation of that
relationship.

This is true in rentier economies in which

the recipients of the rents, or externally generated

revenues such as those derived from the sale of a single

commodity resource such as oil, benefit enormously.
Because the state's economy is not based upon the domestic

population's surplus production, but rather upon the income
derived from the commodity export, which is then

distributed amongst the population in various ways,
participation by the local population in the growth of the

economy and political process is limited.
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There is little

motivation to alter the arrangement in favor of a more

democratic system.1
Though these subjugated countries are politically

independent, they continue to be economically dependent in
many ways on the imperial power.

This poses a problem,

however, due to the instability of the power structure of
the former colonies.

In many colonies, the dominant power had in the
past disrupted the traditional ruling groups and

destroyed their political power.

In addition,

the mother countries created and sponsored elites
which were psychologically and economically

dependent on the foreign rulers.

(Magdoff 2003,

p. 112)

During the time of colonialism, this was an effective and
relatively inexpensive way to keep a nation within the

empire of the dominant state.

This arrangement poses a

problem from the perspective of the both the core and

peripheral states.

For the peripheral nation it hinders

their autonomous political and economic development.

1 See chapter five for further discussion of the rentier
economy, its connection to imperialism and the relationship
between Middle Eastern nations and Western capitalist
powers.
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Magdoff explains the weakness in this arrangement for the
peripheral nation "was that it prevented the emergence of
the self-reliance and strength needed by any one sector to

take power in its own name and reshape the economy for its
own purposes"

(Magdoff 2003, p. 112). For the core nation

it creates a situation in which more direct applications of

power must be used in order to create a stable political
and economic environment for investment.

Therefore, the

retention of influence and control by the metropolitan
centers in the post colonial period has required special
attention by the states of the capitalist powers.

The

techniques used fall into several categories: 1) where
possible, formal economic and political arrangements are

used to maintain former ties.

These include preferential

trade agreements and maintenance of currency blocs; 2)

manipulation and support of the local ruling groups with
the goal of keeping the influence of the metropolitan

center and preventing internal social revolution; 3)

establishing influence and control over the direction of
economic development, and as much as possible, over
government decisions affecting the allocation of resources
(Magdoff 2003, p. 112).
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Magdoff states that the roots of imperialism are to be

found in the expansive drive of each advanced capitalist
nation to operate on a world scale, the development of

monopoly, and the national rivalries associated with the
needs of advanced economies with monopolistic structures.

( (Magdoff 2003, p. 105) However, as capitalist enterprise
searches out export markets, the overseas areas often do
not have enough goods to offer in exchange.

As a result,

many of the countries which buy from industrialized
countries fall into debt, since their imports tend to

exceed their exports.

Under these conditions the need for

loan capital from the metropolitan centers increases and

capital exports become an important means to the
continuation of export of goods.

(Magdoff 2003, p. 94)

This situation will continue because, according to Magdoff,

.

.

.given a chance to make additional profits

abroad at a higher marginal rate, the

entrepreneur will grab at it, providing that the
politics of the foreign country is friendly to
foreign investment and to the withdrawal of

profits from that country.

(Magdoff 2003, p. 103)

In many cases, imperialist domination forces the
privatization of state enterprises, often selling them to
17

foreign investors from the core countries. Core governments
demand policies such as liberalization, opening local
markets to transnational capital, lowering taxes on
capital, and a smaller role of government through

deregulation of markets (Tabb 2007).
Thus peripheral states have been reorganized in
form and function by the global economic
governance institutions to maximally extract

locally produced surplus and allow its

appropriation by foreign capital and its local
(Tabb 2007)

collaborators.

Because monopoly capital needs to expand abroad, it
requires the assistance and protection of the state (Sweezy

in Chilcote 2000, p. 76).

The impact of imperialism on the

state of the core nation is the need for a strong
centralized government ready and able to rule over distant

territories, to direct the activities of the military, and
to solve complex economic problems, all resulting in an

increase in the power and function of the state (Sweezy in
Chilcote 2000, p. 41).

Magdoff sees the role of the

government in imperialism as neither an initiator of

imperialism, nor as a potential agent for the abolition of
imperialism.

He states the two extremes are:
18

.

.

. 1) those who see the government as merely

the direct servant of large corporations and
banks, and 2) those who see government as an
independent force that arbitrates conflicting

interests and has wide freedom of choice in

setting policy.

(Magdoff 2003, p. 107)

Instead, the functions of government in advanced societies
result in the development of a political structure with

responsibilities adapted to maintaining political power
(Magdoff 2003, p. 107).

Because of this a government may

or may not be responsive to the needs of particular firms

The actions of government will be

or industries.

influenced
.

.

. by their own sense of what is best suited

to keep themselves in power.

Even a political

regime responsive to the pressures of a

particular industry or firm will... withstand such
pressure in the overall long-term interest of the
class, or classes, it relies on to remain in
power.

(Magdoff 2003, p. 107)

In order for a political regime to retain its political
power it must have a successful economy. The ultimate test

of a government's competence, or its ability to achieve its

19

political and military goals, is a successful economy.

However, that economic success rests on the success of big

business and big finance (Magdoff 2003, p. 108).
Magdoff argues that we must keep in mind, in light of

the limited alternatives open to political regimes, two

significant developments that prepared the way for the new

imperialism.

"The internal conflicts among competing

vested interest groups within the Great Powers became

resolved in favor of the needs of large-scale industry and
the financiers of these industries", and "the successful

development of large-scale industry is associated with

increasing concentration of power" (Magdoff 2003, p. 107-

108).

Therefore, a later government has to continue to

pursue similar paths, even when no longer party to previous

conflicts, in order to provide a comfortable environment
for industrialist and bankers, "an environment that would

stretch over as much of the world as these interest groups

need to operate in" (Magdoff 2003, p. 108).

So in order

for a government to maintain its political power it must

maintain a successful economy, and in order to do so, it
must, in many cases, cater to the interests of large

corporations and financial institutions.

20

The connection linking the economic and political

relationships of the monopoly firm or corporation, and the

state in imperialism is important.

These giant

corporations must gain control over the sources of raw

materials.

Magdoff writes, "Ownership of and control over

raw material supplies is, as a rule, an essential

prerequisite for the ability of a leading firm or group of

leading firms to limit new competition and to control
production and prices of the finished products" (Magdoff
2003, p. 42).

The history of the oil industry is a classic

example of this.

As the age of formal colonies ended, what

became important to both the corporations and the states
under which those firms were associated, was to be able to

hold on to as many of the economic and financial benefits
of the former colonies as possible.

This meant the

continuation of economic and financial dependency of former

colonial states on the metropolitan centers (Magdoff 2003,

p. 46).

The economic needs of these firms became enmeshed

with the politics of the states to which they are

associated, according to Magdoff, in several ways.
a) The United States has firms which are large

enough to have, or be able to obtain, sufficient
capital to develop necessary technology and take
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advantage of preempting the field in other
countries,

b) United States firms are supported

in this technological lead by huge government
grants of research and development.

c) These

same firms have had experience in international
operations; either on their own or in cooperation

with the United States government, in the process
of the latter's stretching its various military

and foreign activities around the globe.

(Magdoff

2003, p. 50)
For Magdoff, the essential issue in imperialism is the

nature of control and behavior in business, and the

government's response to the operational needs of business.
Magdoff states, "The decisive issues are...the controls

business firms desire in order to manage world production

and prices for the sake of greater profits" (Magdoff 2003,
p. 52),

The monopolistic firm attempts to achieve

domination and control over sources of supply and markets;
the governments of the core states in which these firms are

located attempt to create policies which allow this to
happen.

Imperialism today has changed its form.

22

The world economy is dominated by the activities

of advanced capitalisms and they control the
institution of regulation.

The rules they enact

are largely designed to meet their interests and
have been savagely disruptive in emerging
markets, as is evident in IMF shock therapies and

World Bank structural adjustment programs, which
are often backed by threats of extra-economic
coercion.

(Howard and King in Chilcote 1999, p.

36)
Therefore imperialism continues to exist today in a more
disguised, yet equally aggressive and overt manner as the

previous eras of imperialist domination characterized by
pillage and plunder of colonial territory.

23

CHAPTER THREE
HISTORY OF WESTERN INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Capitalism began to change toward the end of the

nineteenth century.

Throughout most of the nineteenth

century, the development of capitalism had been mainly

built on competition between rival firms in national
markets and, at least in principle, free trade between

nations.

But from about 1880, the mature economies of the

principal states of Europe and the United States were

dominated by gigantic industrial and financial monopolies.
The national governments supported the existence of these

powerful firms through the imposition of tariffs, the

acquisition of colonies, and large-scale expenditure on
armaments, increasingly discarding their commitments to

laissez-faire and free trade policies (Heller 2006, p. 16) .

Support from the state became indispensable to the pursuit

of new markets.

In each imperialist country, state policy

became increasingly integrated with the economic strategies

of the most powerful monopoly capitalists (Heller 2006, p.

16).

Late-nineteenth century imperialism was driven by

the need to export increasing amounts of surplus capital in

search of profitable investment.

24

Major capitalist

financial institutions facilitated the export of capital
through increasingly sophisticated credit operations
(Heller 2006, p. 16).

The effects of this economic policy

began to be felt in the Middle East as European powers

expanded their influence into the region.

The long history

of western involvement in the Middle East sheds light on
the political motivations behind the relationship between
the western powers and the Middle East.

From 1517 until the end of World War I, the Ottoman
Empire was the ruling power in the central Middle East.

At

its peak, the Ottoman Empire was both a European and a

Middle Eastern power, stretching from southeastern Europe,
through Anatolia, the Fertile Crescent in what is now Iraq,

through the Hijaz region in what is now Saudi Arabia, the
regions along the Mediterranean of what are now Syria,
Lebanon, and Israel, into Northern Africa and parts of
Egypt.

The Ottoman Empire began a long period of

transformation beginning in the seventeenth century with
the penetration of European merchant capital into the

empire, which caused a displacement of the Ottoman economy.
The penetration of European manufactured goods into the

empire and the eventual domination of Ottoman commerce by

Europeans were facilitated by a series of commercial
25

treaties, know as Capitulations.

Most of these agreements

were modeled after the first agreement negotiated with

France in 1536, which allowed French merchants to trade
freely in Ottoman ports, to be exempt from Ottoman taxes,
and to import and export goods at low tariff rates.
Additionally, the treaty granted extraterritorial

privileges to French merchants by permitting them to come

under the legal jurisdiction of the French consul in
Istanbul, and not subject to Ottoman-Islamic law (Cleveland
2004, p. 50).

These treaties had devastating effects on

the Ottoman economy as well as long-term political

implications.

With the end of the Napoleonic Wars of 1815, came the
penetration of European commerce into the Middle East to an
unprecedented extent.

Because of the incursions of

European commerce and capital, the formerly self-sufficient

economies of the Middle East became integrated into the
world economy.

However, for the most part the Middle East

became incorporated into the global economic system as a
dependent region, as a supplier of raw agricultural

commodities and a consumer of European manufactured goods
(Cleveland 2004, p. 58).
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In the mid-1800's, following the Anglo-Turkish
Commercial Convention of 1838, the process of British and
other European expansion into the Ottoman economy

increased.

The Anglo-Turkish Commercial Convention of 1838

extended extraterritorial privileges to all foreign traders

and abolished the state's protective tariffs and monopolies

(Berberoglu 1999, p. 7).

This led to a reversal in the

import-export structure of the empire and led to the

destruction of the textile industry in Ottoman Turkey.
Soon many other branches of Ottoman industry were affected,
and by the late 1800's Ottoman industry was on the verge of

collapse.

This marked the end of industrialization in the

manufacturing sector and the empire was instead relegated

to raw materials production for the needs of a world
economy dominated by Europe (Berberoglu 1999, p.

7).

By

destroying the native industry, Europe was able to turn the
Ottoman Empire gradually into an "agrarian reserve of the
expanding European capitalist economies" (Berberoglu 1999,
p. 8).

By the late nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire

had essentially become a semi-colony of the expanding

Western powers.
By the mid 1920's the Western capitalist powers had

divided up the Middle East amongst themselves to secure
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trade routes, raw materials, and new markets for the

expanding world economy controlled by Europe
k
1999, p. 9).

(Berberoglu

The object was control over the oil needed to

fuel their expanding capitalist economies.

Control over petroleum resources became the
overriding focus of Western rivalry in the area

and the main impetus for the Western powers to

establish and maintain political and economic
control over the region.

(Berberoglu 1999, p.

9)

Through the influx of foreign capital in search of raw

materials at low prices, profitable investments for their

capital, markets for their products, and the guarantee of
safe lines of communication, Europeans were able to control
banking, the means of transportation and communication
through railways, ports and roads, the main services such

as water, gas, electricity, and telephone, as well as
mining and oil.
Persia, now Iran, became a major center for Western
imperialist designs because of their rich oil resources.

Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India, described Persia as one of

"the pieces on a chessboard upon which is being played out

a game for the domination of the world"
136).

(Yergin 1991, p.

Britain and Russia fought for influence over Persia
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through concessions and loans and other tools of economic

diplomacy.

William Knox D'Arcy, a British capitalist,

became the founder of the oil industry in the Middle East,
when the British government decided to back his venture in
Persia in order to balance against Russian influence in the
region.

On May 28, 1901, Shah Muzaffar al-Din signed the

oil concession to D'Arcy good for sixty years, covering

three-quarters of the country (Yergin 1991, p. 137).

However, D'Arcy soon began to fall under financial
difficulties, which worried the British as they feared
losing control of the oil concession under control of a

British venture.

The British Admiralty did not want to

lose the possibility of obtaining a source of secure
supplies of fuel oil for the British fleet, and argued that
British majority control in the concession should be

maintained at all costs.

The Admiralty asked D'Arcy, in

regards to the concession, to allow for its acquisition by
a British syndicate.

Lord Strathcona was asked to become

the head of a "syndicate of patriots" and the concession

was arranged to be taken over by a firm called Burmah oil,

founded by Scottish merchants in 1886.

Burmah oil had

concerns about whether or not Persia could be considered

under British protection.

The Foreign Office reassured
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them that it could, thus was born British "profits and

politics" inextricably linked to Persia and the growth of
British and other Western nation's interest in Middle
Eastern oil

(Yergin 1991, p. 142).

Following the breakup of the Ottoman Empire after
World War I the map of the modern Middle East started to be

drawn.

In the drawing of these borders for new states,

which had previously not existed in the region, the

interests of some were served while those of others were
ignored.

Forces behind new ideas such as nationalism and

self-determination were calling for the borders to be drawn

to reflect the interests of some groups, while others,
particularly the "Great Powers", or those European powers

on the side of the Allies in WWI, were looking to serve

their own interests in acquiring and maintaining natural
resources, commodity acquisition, access to waterways and

imperial holdings in the Middle East through the creation
of a friendly or pliable political ally in the region.

World War I was entered into by the Great Powers of
Europe, particularly Britain,

France, and Russia, with the

intention of gaining as much of the territory of the
crumbling Ottoman Empire as possible.

The agreements

entered into during and after World War I by the British
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with various leaders in Europe and the Middle East were
done so with the intention of winning the war in order to

gain the Ottoman territory for their own, whether through
direct colonial rule or indirect economic and political

influence via mandates and protectorates.

Even after

official colonialism came to an end, Western Powers
continued to play a dominant role in determining the

economic and political policies and future of the Middle
East.

By 1922, the modern map of the Middle East was
essentially drawn into existence.

The interests of the

European colonial powers, primarily Britain and France,
were served by the settlement on the boundaries more so
than those of the local populations.

The series of

conflicting agreements, including the recommendations of
the De Bunsen Committee, the Husayn-McMahon

Correspondences, the Sykes Picot Agreement, and the
Fourteen Points for the League of Nations, made in regards

to the former Ottoman territory in the Middle East have had
lasting effects shaping the events of the region into the

present day.
The British had wanted to maintain the status quo in

terms of the territory of the Ottoman Empire prior to World
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War I because it allowed them to guard the areas it saw as
most vital to them for strategic reasons, such as southern
Iraq, where they controlled the oil fields, and in Egypt

where the Suez Canal served as the gateway to their Asian
colonies, most importantly India.

The British were able to

control this territory with little challenge from other

European Powers for the most part, through the continued

existence of the Ottoman Empire.

At the end of World War

I, the Ottoman Empire was broken apart, and the balance of
power now rested on the equitable parceling out of the
former Ottoman territory to the Great Powers based on

recognized geopolitical interests (Smith 1992, p. 39).

In

the immediate post war period, British officials sought to

advance the strategic interests of Britain at the expense
of their allies, rather than working within the former
diplomatic boundaries of compromise to maintain balance of
power and avoid conflicts among European powers.
The British cabinet appointed a special committee

chaired by Maurice de Bunsen in April 1915 to explore
options for defining potential areas of interest to Britain

in the Middle East.

The de Bunsen Committee delivered its

report on June 30, 1915.

It identified four potential

options for the fate of the former Ottoman territory.
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The

option most favored by the British stipulated that the oil

fields of Mosul would be under direct British control or
influence and also took into account Britain's desire to

build a railway from Haifa in Palestine to Baghdad and
Basra in Iraq in order to increase the security of their
empire in India and their oil fields in southern Iraq by

creating a direct link between the Mediterranean and the

Persian Gulf across the territory they controlled.

France,

under the committee's recommendations, would be given

Syria, including Lebanon, from south of Damascus to
southern Anatolia in order to compensate them for losing

Palestine.

Throughout 1915, the Ottoman Empire was beginning to

crumble from within due to internal revolts against the
Sultan's rule and France was bearing the brunt of terrible

trench warfare on the western front.

The French could not

directly protect their Middle Eastern interests and were

alarmed at Britain's growing military involvement in the

region.

Within this context, in order to resolve the

concerns about the post war division of Middle Eastern

territories, France and Britain moved urgently ahead in

negotiating the terms for the post war land settlements.
Britain and France through their principle negotiators, Sir
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Mark Sykes, the Assistant Secretary to the British War
Cabinet, and Georges Picot, former French Consul-general in
Beirut, began negotiations in December 1915.

They drew up

a secret treaty in which they divided up most of the Arab

Middle East between them.

The treaty remained secret,

except to those who had a say or stake in its outcomes,

including Britain, France, and Russia.

The agreement

recognized the long standing French claims to Syria by

awarding France a large zone of direct control stretching

along the Syrian coast from southern Lebanon into Anatolia,

including Syria just west of the "districts" of Damascus,
Homs, Hama, and Aleppo through northern Iraq, including

Mosul, to the Iranian border, and gave France a sphere of
exclusive indirect influence in the Syrian interior.
Britain gained the right to exercise direct control over
southern Mesopotamia and was granted a huge zone of

indirect influence stretching from Gaza to Kirkuk, thus

protecting the Baghdad-Basra line and establishing the
linkage to the Mediterranean recommended by the De Bunsen

In the areas of direct authority both Britain

Committee.

and France would have the right,

.

.

. to establish such direct or indirect

administration as they desire and as they think
34

fit to arrange with Arab State or Confederations

of Arab States.

In the spheres of indirect

influence, each would have priority of right of
enterprise and local loans...and shall lone supply
advisors or foreign functionaries at the request

of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab
States.

(Smith 1992, p.48)

What became known as the Sykes-Picot agreement,

ratified in

April 1916, was one of the most controversial documents of

the war.
These documents were created under the assumption that
if a population, "more or less homogenous in language and
religion, with a little assistance and a good deal of

advice", could be protected from external aggression, and
the European mandated government could keep internal

violence under control, then the new state would, "speedily

and spontaneously organize themselves into a democratic
state, on modern lines"

(Kedourie 1987, p. 41).

And the

European designers of these agreements presumed, or at
least hoped, that the new states would also be open to
continued European control of the resources that were
necessary to their geo-strategic and economic interests.
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At the end of the War, in the face of a changed world
pattern of power, Britain had four major concerns with

respect to the future of the Middle East which they used as
their basis for negotiating the terms of the peace

settlements.

Those concerns included the continued access

to and defense of India, security for the oil fields, a
stable regime bordering Mesopotamia where the bulk of their

territory lay, and a buffer zone between British territory
of interest and Bolshevik Russia.

In addition to the

desires of Britain, several other players arrived on the
scene to exert their interests in the formation of a post
war Middle East.

At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the final

settlement agreements reapportioned Ottoman Arab provinces
and divided them into mandates. Britain received mandates
for Iraq & Palestine, France the mandate for Syria.

In

April 1920, in drawing up the settlement, the Allies could

have considered the new principle of self-determination but

instead they chose to apply the principle only when it

furthered their own interests or coincided with their
sympathies.

So instead of an "independent" Iraq and Syria,

what came to be were the mandates, which were nothing more
than nineteenth-century imperialism repackaged to give the
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appearance of self-determination.

The Treaty of Sevres

created Iraq out of the three Ottoman provinces of Basra,
Baghdad, and Mosul that had little in common.

By acquiring

control over the new entity of Iraq through the mandate,

Britain enhanced its position in the Persian Gulf, secured
the approaches to India, and gained access to petroleum

resources

By 1922 it was thought that the "Middle Eastern
Question" had been answered by the division of territory

into new political entities, being primarily overseen by
the British, French, Russians, and Turkey.

The settlement

of 1922 was not a single act, agreement, or document, but
rather was the design that emerged from many separate acts,
agreements and documents. The partitioning of the Middle

East came from documents such as a trade agreement signed
by the Soviet Union and Britain in 1921.

France and

Britain partitioned the rest of the Middle East territory

through such documents as France's League of Nations
Mandate to rule Syria and Lebanon in 1922, Britain's League

of Nations Mandate to rule Palestine including Transjordan
in 1922, and the treaty of 1922 with Iraq which Britain saw

to serve as approval of a Mandate to rule Iraq.

Britain,

France, and Russia each established states in their
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respective spheres of influence in the Middle East, that
had previously not existed, appointed persons to govern

them, and drew boundaries between them.

"As they had long

intended to do, the European powers had taken the political

destinies of the Middle Eastern peoples in their hands- and
they did so by the terms of...the settlement of 1922"
(Fromkin 1989, p. 560).
Britain's long time aspirations to annex new colonies

in the Middle East had come to fruition too late, as

Europeans could no longer pursue colonialism with adequate
resources, and to a growing number of Europeans,

imperialism seemed out of place in the modern age.

In the

first years of the war it had still seemed a viable
possibility for Britain and other European nations to gain

colonial holdings in the Middle East.

However, Britain was

able to commit itself to a presence in the Middle East only
because Winston Churchill had made it seem possible to the
British people that it could be done relatively

inexpensively at a time when British subjects no longer saw
the benefits of an empire, and rather viewed maintaining
one as a costly drain on a society desperately in need of

investing its resources in rebuilding itself after the war.
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In the years following the settlements, Britain came
to govern the Middle East with little sense of direction,

though the purpose in theory of the mandate system was to
guide the local leaders and population through the process

of nation-building and self-rule.

The Middle East in many

respects is today what it is because European powers wanted
to reshape it, but Britain and France had, "failed to
ensure that the dynasties, the states, and the political

system that they established would permanently endure"
(Fromkin 1989, p. 563).

During and after World War I, the

old order in the Middle East was destroyed, and to take its

place, Britain and France, "created countries, nominated
rulers, delineated frontiers, and introduced a state system

of sort that exists everywhere else; but they did not quell
all significant local opposition to those decisions"

(Fromkin 1989, p. 563).

As David Fromkin points out, "the

events of 1914-1922, while bringing to an end Europe's
Middle Eastern Question, gave birth to a Middle Eastern
Question in the Middle East itself" where many people and

nations are not only fighting over borders and boundaries,
but the right to exist at all, as their needs and desires
for autonomy were ignored and overlooked in the post war

settlements in favor of putting into place a system that
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would further the economic and geo-strategic interests of
Britain and to some degree France, Russia, and the United

States (Fromkin 1989, p. 563).
It was in this interwar period that the U.S. interests
in the Middle East began to emerge.

The growing

involvement of the U.S. in the area was dictated by the

region's oil wealth.

In reaction to British dominance over

world petroleum markets, U.S. oil companies began to

prospect for oil in Saudi Arabia during the 1930's.

During

the Second World War, the Saudi monarchy entered into an

exclusive economic and political relationship with the

United States as a counter to British control over the
surrounding Arab states.

Half of all global oil production

was concentrated in the Middle East, and State Department

planners envisioned postwar expansion of U.S. interests
into the oil fields of the Persian Gulf and Iran (Heller

2006, p. 50).
It turned out that Saudi Arabia in particular had the

world's largest oil reserves, and it was from Saudi Arabia
and the other oil-producing states of the Middle East that
the majority of new petroleum supplies for the postwar

global market came.

In the following decades, oil's

relative cheapness led to the rapid transfer of the
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industrialized economies in Europe and Asia from coal to

oil.

Control of this strategic commodity by the U.S. was

critical to their dominance over the postwar global
economy.

Politically, the U.S. goal became to reduce

British and French influence in the Middle East, while
increasing its own (Heller 2006, p. 50).

The decline of

British imperialism facilitated the U.S. assuming a

dominant role in the region.

One essential component

justifying the expanding U.S. influence was the pretext of
containing Russian or communist influence (Heller 2006, p.

50) .

Toward the end of World War II, Washington was able to

acquire oil concessions from the Iranian government.

U.S.

defense of Iranian territorial integrity greatly reinforced

their influence in the country at the expense of the USSR
and Great Britain.

Monarchist politicians in Iran looked

to the U.S. to reorganize and equip the Iranian police and

army and to plan the development of Iran's oil economy.
The U.S. was on its way to superseding British influence in

Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East.

Domestically the

U.S. found that opposition to Russian communist influence
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in the region proved an effective factor in pursuit of this

goal (Heller 2006, p, 51).2
Western capitalist powers were seeking access to the

primary materials of the third world at the lowest possible

cost, while looking for profitable markets and investment
opportunities.

In the Post World War II period, radical

nationalists in the newly independent states sought to

raise the price of primary products, to use these products

in state-directed development programs, and to restrict

foreign imports and investments.

This demand for economic

autonomy threatened the U.S., which needed access to
foreign raw materials, markets, and investment
opportunities.

As a result, the United States became

increasingly entangled in the politics of Southeast Asia,
the Middle East, and Africa (Heller 2006, p. 76).

U.S.

intervention in Lebanon (1958) and Iran (1953) and the

restraint of its French and British allies during the Suez

Crisis (1956) marked the active engagement of the United

2 Success in Iran and Turkey (U.S. president Truman
committing a permanent force to the Mediterranean, the U.S.
Sixth Fleet which dominates the Mediterranean to this day,
in order to stop Soviet access to the Mediterranean through
th2e straits of the Dardanelles) was part of the process
that made the containment of Soviet ambitions the rationale
for the emergence of Washington's sphere of influence in
the Middle East (Heller 2006, p. 51) .
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States in Middle East politics for the first time.

By

1957, the Eisenhower Doctrine promised that the U.S. would

intervene to guarantee the security of Middle Eastern

states threatened by Communist subversion.

From this point

on it was the U.S., not Great Britain, which would

undertake the protection of Western access to oil in the
Middle East (Heller 2006, p. 118).

One such place was in

Iran during the Cold War.
The U.S. was intimately involved with the Iranian

government under the Shah from the 1950's until the 1979

Revolution.

The U.S. has had an ongoing interventionist

policy with regards to the region based upon the need for
capitalist expansion by U.S. corporations via the policies

of the U.S. state.

Military spending is encouraged and

intervention abroad is also viewed as in line with meeting

both political and economic objectives.

Under Keynesian

policies, military expenditure is 'safer' economically than
other forms of government spending because it provides a

way of injecting money into the economy without increasing

production in the economy.

The expansion is what propels

the geographic extension of the capitalist system to new

regions of the world.

An example of this intervention is

the U.S. involvement in Iran in the overthrow of the
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Iranian Mosaddiq government and subsequent U.S. support of
the dictatorship of the Shah.

In this way, world security

order, or security for capital accumulation was legitimized
under the policies of the Cold War.

Many times dictators in ex-colonial countries have

been supported by the United States to forestall or

obstruct the emergence of regimes that might be less than
sympathetic to purely economic exploitation. An example is
the coup promoted by the CIA in Iran in 1953, which

overthrew the democratically elected nationalist government
of Dr. Mosaddiq when he attempted to nationalize Iranian

oil.

Under the pro-Western regime which followed under

Shah Reza Muhammad Pahlavi, American companies strengthened

their position at the expense of the Iranians and the
British, who ruled Iranian oil through the UK-owned Anglo-

Persian Oil Company that began operations in 1908.

Soon

thereafter, U.S. companies took a large share of the oil

concession and the U.S. replaced Britain as the most

influential foreign power.

The State Department in the

U.S. sought to force Great Britain to give U.S. companies a

share of the lucrative Middle Eastern oil concessions.

Before Mosaddiq nationalized Iranian oil, British-owned
companies received 100% of the profits from oil.
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After the

1953 coup, which brought the Shah back into power, Iran
reopened Iranian oil concessions, which U.S. companies
received 40% of the former 100% British owned company
(Shalom 1993).

The British dominance in Iranian oil by the

Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was not restored to its previous
dominance and was instead replaced by U.S. interests.

In October 1969, the Shah asked the U.S. to purchase

more Iranian oil as a way to boost revenues.

The Shah's

request was rejected because a substantial portion of the

profits from these purchases would go to non-American
companies if Iranian oil was bought. If Saudi oil was

purchased, the U.S. share would be larger (Shalom 1993).
Instead of the U.S. pursuing a balanced economic

relationship with Iran, and reciprocating the economic
relationship in a way that was favorable to Iran's economy,
the U.S pursued a policy that undoubtedly benefited the

U.S. economically, though Iran received desired product and

assistance in exchange.

For 25 years, Iran served as a key

U.S. ally in the Middle East region, and key consumer of

expensive U.S. military hardware.

The United States

initiated its military assistance grant program to Iran in

1950 and established a Military Assistance Advisory Group
(MAAG) to administer the program.
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In 1962, the two

missions were consolidated into a single military
organization, ARMISH-MAAG, which remained active in Iran

until the Islamic revolutionary regime came to power in

United States military assistance to Iran between

1979.

1947 and 1969 exceeded US$1.4 billion, mostly in the form

of grant aid before 1965 and of Foreign Military Sales
credits during the late 1960s (Global Security 2006).
The financial assistance programs were terminated

after 1969, when it was determined that Iran, by then an

important oil exporter, could assume its own military
costs. Thereafter, Iran paid cash for its arms purchases

and covered the expenses of United States military
personnel serving in the ARMISH-MAAG and TAFT programs.

Iran depended on the United States for security assistance,
to the mid-1970s, when the government-to-government Foreign

Military Sales program dominated other issues. Arms

transfers increased significantly after the 1974 oil price
rise, accelerating at a tremendous pace until 1979. From

fiscal year 1950 through FY 1979, United States arms sales

to Iran totaled approximately US$11.2 billion, of which
US$10.7 billion were actually delivered (Global Security
2006) .
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The Kissinger Accord in 1972 included designs to sell
the Shah of Iran all the conventional weapons he could

afford to buy, an initiative that was made before the 19731978 rise in prices of crude oil to a level high enough to

make the Shah's regime the largest arms purchaser in the

world by the U.S. lifting all normal restraints on the
transfer of weapons to third world countries (Paolucci

1991, p. 124).

J.C. Hurewitz, professor of government and

director of the Middle East Institute at Columbia

University wrote an article entitled

After Iran's Revolution

The Persian Gulf:

(New York, 1979) that states,

Between 1945 and 1972 Iran had spent a total of

$1.2 billion on arms imports.

Over the next

half-dozen years, the Shah entered into
commitments for the purchase of more than $18

billion worth of weapons, among them some of the
most sophisticated systems in the inventories of
the United States.

(Hurewitz in Paolucci 1991, p.

124)
Since high crude oil prices are useless or even

antithetical to American economic interests, the sale of

arms in mass numbers during this period was a way to get
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Iran's petrodollars to flow back to the U.S. economy via
U.S. arms production corporations.
Iran, under the Shah, was America's number one arms

customer, accounting for 25 per cent of the $71 billion in
military orders placed by foreign governments under the

Foreign Military Sales program between FY 1950 and FY 1977.3
During a May 1972 visit to Iran by President Nixon, as part

of the Nixon-Kissinger policy of relying on 'friendly'
Third World powers to maintain regional stability in

strategic areas, the Shah was given a virtual carte blanche
to purchase anything in the U.S. arsenal except nuclear
weapons.
U.S. support of the Shah in Iran was part of Cold War

policy to maintain stability in the Middle East, as well

3 "In the twelve years following the 1953 military coup, the
United States poured over $1.2 billion in aid into Iran,
almost half of which went to the Iranian Army, the Shah's
evolving power base. Between Fiscal Year (FY) 1950 and FY
1977, the United States supplied Iran with over $20 billion
worth of arms, ammunition, training, and technical
assistance under the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and
the Foreign Military Sales Program (FMS)."3 Between 1970
and 1978, Iran spent $18 billion on U.S. arms under the FMS
cash sales program. Iranian orders for new hardware were
being placed faster than the weapons could be produced and
delivered; therefore at the end of 1978 there was an
outstanding balance of $12 billion worth of undelivered
arms destined for Iran.(IranSource. Institute for Policy
Studies.
1979. Washington. Nov. 1, 2006.
http://www.irvl.net/USMI.htm.)
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keep a western-friendly power in place in an oil rich
nation to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining control of

Iranian oil.

Since the Shah in Iran was overthrown by the

1979 Revolution, leading to a new Islamic government, U.S.
policies towards Iran have not been favorable to Iranian
interests because Iran was no longer willing to cater to

western imperialist interests.

Both the U.S. government

and U.S. firms incurred indirect costs as a result of the

Iranian cancellations. When student militants in Tehran
seized hostages at the US Embassy that year, Washington cut
off diplomatic and economic relations with Iran, imposing

comprehensive sanctions.

U.S. oil companies have not been

able to return to the country since then, but European and

Asian companies have large and growing operations in Iran,

especially in the oil and gas sector, leading to new and
potentially explosive international rivalries.

Iran

continues to be a source of imperial rivalry over
The case of Iran is an

competition for investments.

example of how the policies of the U.S. towards Iran are
preventing growth for U.S. companies and are in conflict
with other capitalist nations.
During the 1980's, the U.S. pursued a policy of

"balance of power" with Iran and Iraq so as not to allow
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one or the other to gain the position of the dominant power

in the region or exert too much influence over the region,
especially in terms of control over oil resources.

The

Reagan administration announced its intention to continue
defending the free flow of Middle East oil, by whatever
means necessary.

During the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), the

U.S. sold weapons and gave support in the form of

intelligence and aid to both sides so that neither Iran nor

Iraq could achieve a clear victory in the conflict, as well
as to discourage both sides from accepting aid or support
from the Soviet Union.

Between 1985 and 1986 the U.S. was

secretly providing arms and intelligence to Iran, via
Israel transferring vast quantities of U.S.-origin weapons

to Iran, resulting in the Iran-Contra Scandal (Shalom 1993,
P- 3) •
Under the Carter Administration, the U.S. removed Iraq

from its list of countries supporting terrorism and began
to provide $500 million in annual commodity credits, and

another $500 million in Export-Import Bank guarantees for
an oil pipeline (Richman 1991, p. 7).

The Reagan

Administration continued to encourage Arab financial
assistance to Iraq and urged American allies not to sell
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weapons to Iran.

In 1984, Reagan resumed diplomatic

relations with Iraq.

That same year Iran was declared a supporter of

international terrorism, thus making them ineligible for
various forms of U.S. foreign assistance.

On October 29,

1987 President Reagan signed Executive Order 12613, which
banned U.S. imports of Iranian crude oil and all other
Iranian imports because of Iran's support for terrorism and

its threat to maritime traffic in the Persian Gulf.

Iraq emerged from the Iran-Iraq war with a narrow
victory on August 20, 1988. The various forms of aid via
the U.S. had a direct effect on Iraq's ability to hold out
against Iran's offensive.

At the end of the war,

Iraq had

a huge military establishment which led Sadaam Hussein to

believe he was the leader of the Arab world.

The U.S. intervened in Iraq as the leader of the
coalition to protect Kuwaiti oil during Operation Desert

Storm, which began with an allied attack on January 17,

1991. During the first Gulf War, the invasion of Kuwait,
and the possibility of defeating Iraq, offered the U.S. the
perfect opportunity to establish its dominance over the
oil-rich Middle East.

It was to become the moment of

assertion by President George H. W. Bush of a New World
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Order based on U.S. leadership.

As the single world power

in the post-Cold War, the U.S. would assert its dominance
by organizing a multilateral military and political
coalition to expel Iraq from Kuwait.

The gain for the U.S.

was immense; its dominance over the Middle East and its

petroleum resources was now incontestable.

Likewise, its

post-Cold War role as a global hegemon was also confirmed
(Heller 2006, p. 283).

Under the Clinton administration, the U.S. pursued a
new policy towards Iraq and Iran known as "dual

containment".

Under this policy sanctions were implemented

in an attempt to isolate Iran economically and
diplomatically in order to force a regime change, in hopes

that a more pro-U.S. regime sympathetic to U.S. strategic

interests in the region would be installed.

On March 5,

1995, the U.S. oil company Conoco signed a $1 billion deal
to develop Iranian oil fields, the first such contract

since the 1979 revolution, but Conoco backed out of the
deal after Washington voiced objections.

On March 15,

1995, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12957,
banning U.S. investment in Iran's energy sector.

On May 6,

1995 President Clinton issued Executive Order 12959,

banning U.S. trade and investment in Iran.
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On August 4,

1996 President Clinton signed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act
(ILSA) into law, which imposes at least two of six

sanctions on foreign companies that make an investment of
more than $20 million in one year in Iran's energy sector.
The United States in the 1990's was pursuing the oil
and gas reserves of the area of the Caspian Sea and the

regions to the east in Central Asia and further into the
Middle East.

While they do not quite match those of the

Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia to the south, they are

enormous nonetheless.

Possible oil reserves in the Caspian

basin and the region to its east are calculated in excess
of 200 billion barrels.

The area has in addition 40

percent of the world's proven natural gas reserves.

With

the breakup of the Soviet Union, the region was split into
the independent states of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan,

Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan (Heller 2006, p.
311).

The big American oil companies interested in the

region- Chevron, Union Oil of California, Amoco, and Exxontried to acquire concessions and to make pipeline deals in
the region immediately following the collapse of the Soviet

Union, but they were initially refused.

In 1997, the

Clinton administration began to deploy troops and establish
bases in several of the ex-Soviet republics.
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The Russian

government consented to the American intrusion, despite

deep misgivings (Heller 2006, p. 311).

The U.S. military

presence then facilitated the closing of several important
oil and pipeline deals.4
The American intervention in Central Asia was part of

an overall strategy to assure control over the oil-rich

Middle East.

The new military bases in the ex-Soviet

republics were not as large, however, as the growing
military capacity of CENTCOM in the Persian Gulf.

At the

end of the Gulf War, American military bases in Saudi

Arabia and Kuwait, adjacent to Iraq, were reinforced.

In

the course of the 1990's, American bases were established

in the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Djibouti, Egypt, Israel,
and Turkey.

The Americans pre-positioned enormous

4 Pipeline agreements included one by Chevron running from
Kazakhstan to Baku to the Russian Black Sea port of
Novorossiisk. The project was linked to the American
acquisition of landing and basing rights in Romania,
Bulgaria, and especially, Kosovo in the ex-Yugoslavia .
Since 1999, the Americans had created an enormous base in
Kosovo called Camp Bondsteel. Another pipeline from Baku
through Georgia and Armenia to Turkey's deep water
Mediterranean port of Batumi took form. A third still
unrealized oil and gas pipeline would run from Turkmenistan
through Afghanistan to Pakistan, serving the burgeoning
South and East Asian energy markets. None of these
pipelines were secure. The initial American military
buildup in the former Soviet republics could only be
regarded as preliminary to a much larger operation. (Heller
2006, p. 312)
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quantities of military equipment in the installations, and

large numbers of U.S. warships operated in the Persian

Gulf, Arabia Sea, and Red Sea (Heller 2006, p. 312).

With the dawn of a new administration, the U.S.
presence in the Middle East continues to grow. The current
Bush administration has succeeded in overthrowing the Iraqi

government through the Iraq War beginning in 2003.

Several

reasons for the invasion of Iraq have direct connections to

imperialism as defined by the classical Marxist theorists.
The first being that the interests of U.S. corporations are
the interests of the U.S. government, because under the

stage of monopoly capital, state and corporate interests
are one in the same.

The invasion of Iraq with subsequent

overthrow of Sadaam Hussein was related to control of

petroleum resources and pipeline routes.

The installation

of military bases throughout the region, including Iraq as
well as several areas in central Asia, will ensure the

protection of U.S. corporations desiring to build an oil
pipeline that would circumvent any passage of the pipeline

through Iran, since U.S. corporations are banned from
investing in the Iranian energy sector by ILSA, which on
August 3, 2001, President G.W. Bush signed the ILSA
Extension Act into law.

The occupation of Iraq also has
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direct benefits for U.S. corporations in the fields of
armaments, oil, engineering, and the financial industry.
After World War II, the U.S. emerged as the dominant

capitalist economic power and recognized that in order to
maximize its interests, the existing system had to change
in order for its own economy to continue to grow and

develop in the changed economic and political conditions of
the world after the war.

Roosevelt argued,

U.S. President Franklin

'the structure of peace demands and will

get equality of all people.

Equality of peoples involves

the utmost freedom of competitive trade.'

This definition

of equality meant that countries (that is, industrial ones)
should have "access, without discrimination and on equal

terms, to the markets and to the raw materials of the
world...needed for their economic prosperity" (Biel 2000, p.

58).

During the Cold War these changes for capitalist

growth were framed in discussions and arguments in favor of
security.

"International politics tends to speak of

security as if it were economically neutral, but in the

real world security always creates conditions for the
elites to enjoy their wealth" (Biel 2000, p. 57). The
underlying purpose of the international system was not

solely security, as in defense of sovereignty and interests
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from aggressor nations itself, but security for capitalist
exploitation.
For the United States, free markets and free trade are
key priorities for national security.

The economic

policies of other countries, including their legal and
regulatory policies, tax policies, financial systems,

fiscal policies, and what the U.S. refers to as 'free

trade' is all considered part of the U.S. national security
concerns.

Free trade, however, refers to other nations

opening their markets to the U.S.

One long term objective

of U.S. foreign policy is a world, "in which all countries
have investment-grade credit ratings that allow them access

to international capital markets and to invest in their
future" (Research Unit for Political Economy 2003, p. 72)
Once way the U.S. is attempting to achieve this is by

influencing multilateral institutions such as the IMF and

World Bank to streamline their policies and conditions for
lending, insisting that their development assistance be

tied to measurable goals and benchmarks, and that nations
receiving development aid from them have their development

be predicated to openness of the inflows and outflows of
capital (Research Unit for Political Economy 2003, p. 72).
This is currently the case in Iraq, where Iraq's ability to
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obtain assistance from the IMF in the form of debt

reduction and loans has been directly tied to the IMF
pressing legislators in Iraq to pass a petroleum law

privatizing their oil industry.

One of the long term goals for the U.S. in the Middle
East is to reconstruct not only Iraq, but the other nations

of the region into stable capitalist democracies friendly
to both the United States and Israel.

"This audacious U.S.

plan was born out of overwhelming military strength

combined with a growing sense of economic vulnerability"
(Heller 2006, p. 321).

American military power and control

of Middle East oil would enable the U.S. to reassert its

declining economic supremacy while bolstering the dollar.
Massive increases in military and reconstruction

expenditure in the form of contracts to American companies
would help to reawaken the U.S. economy out of a recession

(Heller 2006, p. 321).
One way the U.S. has been able to restrict the

development of nations with coveted natural resources
greatly needed by the U.S for its own continued economic

growth is to impose economic sanctions on them when they

are unwilling to bend to the demands of the U.S.

policy agenda.

foreign

Economic sanctions were imposed on Iraq by
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UN Security Council Resolution 661, passed in. August 1990.

As .long as sanctions remained in place, no foreign

investment could take place in Iraq, nor could

rehabilitation of Iraq's oil industry. However, as long as
the sanctions were in place, it also meant that the

expansion of Iraqi oil production was impossible. The

United States Department of Energy said:
As of early January 2002, the head of the UN Iraq

program, Benon Sevan, expressed 'grave concern'
at the volume of 'holds' put on contracts for oil
field development, and stated the entire program

was threatened with paralysis.

According to

Sevan, those holds amounted to nearly 2000

contracts worth about $5 billion, about 80% of
which were 'held', by the United States.

(Research Unit for Political Economy 2003, p. 50)

So while the U.S. sees access to Iraq's oil supplies as
vital to its own economic and security interests, only
through the direct benefit to U.S. corporations via

contracts and concessions in the oil industry that the U.S.
wants this access to take place.

Sanctions were imposed on Iran in October of 1987,

when President Reagan signed Executive Order 12613, which
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banned U.S. imports of Iranian crude oil and all other

Iranian imports.

Sanctions on Iran were extended by

President Clinton when he signed Executive Order 12957 on

March 15, 1995, banning all U.S. investments in Iran's
energy sector, Executive Order 12959 on May 6, 1995 banning
U.S. trade and investment in Iran, and by signing into law
the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act on August 4, 1996, which also

sanctions foreign companies if they are to invest in Iran's

energy sector.

President Bush extended the ILSA on August

3, 2001 and renewed EO 12959 in March 2004.

As long as the

sanctions remain in place, U.S. corporations cannot invest

in Iran.
In the post war era, the endemic violence capitalism
generates as a system, with inherent conflicts, tended to
be borne by those poorer nations who are excluded from the

security that the rich enjoy.

Because Iraq and Iran have

been denied the security provided by economic dominance due

to the poor state of their economy resultant of years of
war and sanctions, they are targets for the core nations to

exploit them economically.

This is done by the core

nations, primarily by the United States, but other nations

with economic clout as well, such as the nations of Western
Europe, Japan, China, Russia and India to a growing extent,
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participating in a structural dominance of the world
economy, having a commitment to dismantling the

protectionist tools which developing nations employ to
promote their industry, and a demand that nations of the

periphery, such as Iraq and Iran, make available their raw
materials and that they allow corporations from core

nations the freedom to invest in their economies and
repatriate the profits (Biel 2000, p. 58).

Under these new

economic demands of the capitalist powers, security is put
forward as a valid reason for military involvement in many

nations of the periphery.
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CHAPTER FOUR

WESTERN INVOLVEMENT IN THE OIL INDUSTRY
OF THE MIDDLE EAST

On May 28, 1901 William Knox D'Arcy, with the backing

of the British government, signed the first oil concession
in the Middle East with Iranian Shah Muzaffar al-Din.

The

Shah received twenty thousand pounds in cash, another

twenty thousand pounds worth of shares, as well as 16
percent of annual net profits, a term which was to be

defined.

In return, D'Arcy received a concession good for

sixty years, covering three-quarters of the country (Yergin

1991, p. 137).

In 1905, D'Arcy partnered with Burmah Oil

who created the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) in 1909 as

a subsidiary, in an agreement called the Concession

Syndicate, inextricably linking British "profit and
politics" in Persia (Yergin 1991, p. 142).

This concession

deal essentially gave away control of the oil reserves in
Iran to Britain for the next 60 years.

Britain at this

time was changing its fuel source for the royal navy from

coal to oil, and needed to ensure a cheap and sufficient

supply of the new energy source.

As oil discovery

increased in the Middle East more concessions were to
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follow.

Concession deals were basically agreements that

allowed foreign companies exploration and production rights
for oil in a sovereign nation in exchange for royalty

payments to the host nation.

These concessions came to be

viewed as a loss of sovereignty to many people in the host

nations of the Middle East.
The Anglo-Persian Oil Company, renamed the Anglo-

Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in 1935 (and eventually the
British Petroleum Company (BP) in 1954) signed a new

concession agreement with the Iranian government in 1933,

which was a renegotiation of the terms of the D'Arcy
concession of 1901.

This new concession deal provided Iran

with a modest increase in annual royalty payments from 16

percent to 20 percent of the company's worldwide profits,
and a guarantee of a minimum annual payment of £750,000.

In return, Iran agreed to extend the concession to 1993
from its scheduled expiration date of 1961.

This agreement

did little to improve Iran's economic gain from its oil

resources or to advance its claims to sovereignty over them
(Cleveland 2004, p. 190).
Although Iran was never a formal colony, Iranian

economic development had largely been controlled by
European companies.

Economic domination and imperial
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manipulation characterized Britain's relationship with Iran
up until 1950.

The Iranian government was so displeased

with the terms of the 1933 concession that they began to
In 1950, the

renegotiate revisions in the late 1940's.

revisions were submitted to the Majlis and opposed by
Muhammad Mosaddiq and the National Front, who called for
the cancellation of the concession and the nationalization
of the Iranian oil industry.

In 1951, the Majlis passed

the legislation nationalizing the oil industry and it

invited Mosaddiq to become prime minister.

In response to

the passage of the oil nationalization law, the AIOC called

for a worldwide boycott of Iranian oil.

The British

government endorsed the boycott, reinforced its naval
forces in the Persian Gulf, and imposed economic sanctions

on Iran.

The United Stated joined the boycott in 1952,

essentially preventing Iran from selling its oil on the
international market and plunged the country into economic

crisis by the almost total loss of oil revenues.

Mosaddiq

refused to compromise on the nationalization issue and

severed diplomatic ties with Britain in October 1952.

As

the Iranian economy continued to plummet, the Tudeh Party,

a leftist organization, was gaining strength.

This gave a

group of Iranian military conspirators a motivation to

64

overthrow Mosaddiq, which coincided with the goals of the
U.S. and British governments to contain Soviet influence,

and Mosaddiq was overthrown in a coup in 1953.

The coup

brought the return of the royal dictatorship, and a new oil
arrangement which gave Iran a 50 percent share of the

profits from petroleum.

Diplomatic relations with Britain

were restored in 1954, and the beginning of a close

relationship with the U.S. as a provider of military and
economic aid emerged.

The Iranian government and the

Western powers established an eight-company consortium from
four nations

(Britain, America, the Netherlands,

and

France) which succeeded in getting Iranian oil flowing once

again under the National Iranian Oil Company.

In Saudi Arabia, the first oil concession was granted
by Ibn Sa'ud in 1933 to the Standard Oil Company of
California

(later reorganized as the Arabian American Oil

Company, ARAMCO), which acquired the right to extract and
transport whatever petroleum was found within its
concession in exchange for the construction of a refinery

and the payments of royalties amounting to four gold
shillings per ton of crude oil.

The terms of the

concession were extremely favorable to ARAMCO.

During the

1950's, the concession agreements were modified so that
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Saudi Arabia, and most other Middle Eastern oil producing

nations, received
companies.

50% of the profits from foreign

ARAMCO emerged as a giant multi-national

corporation that controlled not only the exploration and
extraction of Saudi oil, but also its refining, marketing,
and pricing.

The oil-producing countries had little say in

the determining of prices or production levels of oil.
In 1934, Kuwait signed a concession agreement with

Gulf Oil and AIOC, authorizing them to become equal owners

in the concession known as the Kuwait Oil Company.

Commercial oil exports began in 1946 generating an income

in that year of $760,000.

By 1953, oil revenues were $169

million, and rose to $21.7 billion in 1980.

Kuwait was

dependent upon a foreign workforce to develop its petroleum

industry and supporting infrastructure, as well as a source
of technology and equipment that was used to extract the

oil.

In 1925, Iraq, under Faysal's government, signed a
seventy-five year concession with the firm that became the
Iraq Petroleum Company.

The agreement provided for Iraq to

receive modest royalties at a specified sum per ton of oil,
but excluded Iraq from having any ownership in the company.
The Turkish Petroleum Company formed by British, French,

66

and

Dutch interests discovered oil in Iraq near Kirkuk in

In 1928, the U.S entered the Middle East oil race

1927.

when the Near East Development Corporation (NEDC) obtained
an equity interest in Turkish Petroleum' and renamed it the

Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) in 1929.

On July 31, 1928,

nine months after the original discovery, a contract was

signed giving Royal Dutch/Shell, Anglo-Persian, the French,
and NEDC each 23.75 percent of the oil.

The NEDC

originally was made up of 5 companies, but later was

equally divided between Standard of New Jersey (now Exxon)
and Socony Vacuum (later Mobil, which merged with Exxon in

1999).

This far-reaching oil settlement was called the

"Red Line Agreement" because the partners bound themselves
through a "self-denying" clause not to engage in any oil

operations with the territory of what used to be the
Ottoman Empire (excluding the areas of Kuwait and Persia)

except in cooperation with the other members of the Turkish
Petroleum Company (Yergin 1991, p. 205).

The total control that Western-owned companies

maintained over the production, marketing, and pricing of

Middle Eastern oil was a constant reminder of the region's

continuing dependence on the West.

Arab nationalists

increasingly argued against the imperialist nature of the
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oil concessions in the region.

Then in 1972, U.S. and

Britain were excluded from the oil industry in Iraq by

nationalization of the oil industry there.

Companies from

France, Russia, and China had obtained major contracts with
the Iraqi government, but UN sanctions kept the contracts

inoperable.
In order to gain a greater measure of control over

pricing policies, representatives from five of the major
oil producing countries- Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia,

and Venezuela- founded the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960.

A parallel group, the

Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC),
composed solely of Arab oil exporting nations was created
in 1968.

OPEC was founded in the Nasser era, and one of

the principle goals of Nasserism was to break out of the

constraints of postwar neocolonialism that was allowing
Western powers to still manipulate the diplomatic and

economic affairs of the Arab world.

OPEC's immediate

objective was to utilize the collective bargaining power of
its member states to pressure Western oil companies to

increase oil prices.

As long as the world supply of oil

was plentiful, OPEC had limited success in its efforts
to
*
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change the policies and thinking of the oil companies
(Cleveland 2004, p. 456).

Abundant low cost oil was the energy source that
fueled the post World War II recovery of Europe and Japan,

and assured the economic prominence of the United States.
Western industrial economies depended upon oil based on the

assumption that oil would always readily available and
moderately priced.

In 1972, Saudi Arabia was supplying

21.6% of Europe's oil, and 13% of the world's total

production of crude oil in 1973.

Saudi Arabia's share of

U.S. oil imports in 1973 was 8.1% (Cleveland 2004, p. 456).

OPEC used the "oil weapon" to boycott oil sales to western
nations and drive up prices during the October War in 1973

by cutting back production.

This led to increased

participation by OPEC countries in the ownership of oil,

including production operations, and involvement in
refining, distributing, and marketing.

Foreign oil

companies continued to provide the technology and expertise

on which producers still depended and their services were

retained though lease-back arrangements and joint ventures

with the national oil companies.
Concession deals between western corporations and the
governments of oil-producing nations were the dominant form
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of investment contracts used to develop the Middle Eastern
oil industry during the greater part of the 20th century,

until many nations began to nationalize oil production and

move toward more state control of the oil industry.

Today,

the top six OPEC countries use service contracts instead,

which allow the state to retain full authority over all

production decisions and relegate the investing company to
the role of contractor.

No oil-producing nation in the

Middle East has privatized its oil industry, and nations
such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Iran give only

limited usage contracts to international oil companies for
one or two years.

However, Iraq under pressure from the

international community including the United States
government, the British government, the IMF, the U.S. oil

lobby, and International Oil Companies (IOCs) are being
asked to privatize their oil industry through the passage
of a Hydrocarbon Law, which was delivered to the Iraqi

Parliament on February 18, 2007.
The major component of the privatization law is the

use of production-sharing agreements (PSAs), which are

exclusive long-term deals that Iraq's unions compare to
earlier concession agreements.

While Iraqi leaders, such

as Hassan Jumaa Awad, the Iraqi Federation of Oil Unions
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President, believe that Iraqi manpower and international

technology and expertise make a good match for developing
the oil sector, but only on terms advantageous to Iraq.

Awad stated, "It is possible to co-operate with oil
companies through a service contract, for the development
of the oil industry in the service of the Iraqi economy"

(Jasiewicz 2007).

The law under consideration now is the

blueprint for foreign companies to explore, develop,

produce, and sell Iraqi oil under exclusive contracts

lasting up to 30 years.

Most Iraqis favor continued

control by a national company and the powerful oil workers
union there strongly opposes de-nationalization.

A recent

poll commissioned by U.S. and British human rights groups

found that 63 percent of Iraqis believed their oil industry

should be developed by state companies and another 32
percent indicated a strong preference for state control
(Jasiewicz 2007).

However, the Iraqi constitution of 2005,

greatly influenced by U.S. advisors, contains language that
guarantees a major role for foreign companies.

Production-sharing agreements are usually used by
countries with reserves which are hard to gain

thus resulting in high extraction costs.

access to,

The PSAs are

generally applied in circumstances where there is a strong
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possibility that oil exploration will be extremely costly

or even fail.

To offset the huge amount of risk in these

investments, the contracting company is guaranteed a
portion of the profits, if and when oil is extracted and

sold.

Most commonly in these agreements the portion

remains very high until all development costs are
amortized, which allows the investing company to recoup its

investment expenditures and then be rewarded with a largerthan-normal profit margin for the remainder of the

contract, which could extend up to 25 years.

This type of

agreement may be fair or necessary in a country that cannot

generate sufficient investment capital on its own, where
the exploration is difficult (as in cases of it being

underwater or deep underground) , where the reserves may
prove to be very small, or where the ongoing costs of

extraction are very high.

None of these conditions,

however, exist in Iraq, where huge reserves of easily
accessible oil have been proven to exist, and the
discoveries of more fields are likely.

This is why nations

such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, and the United Arab

Emirates do not use PSAs and instead pay the multinational
corporations a fixed rate to explore and develop their
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fields, after which all of the profits become state

revenues (Schwartz 2007).
The Iraqi view of the PSAs is they are turning over
the oil fields to foreign companies, giving them control

over setting royalties, deciding production levels, and

determining whether Iraqis get to work on their own
industry.

To many Iraqis the PSAs are a reflection back to

times of imperialism in the region when the oil industry
was dominated by foreign companies through concessions.

If

privatization is to be implemented and PSAs were enacted,

Iraq would lose control over the amount of oil the country

produced with the potential to substantially weaken OPEC

influence on the oil market.

The law would allow oil

companies to repatriate all profits from oil sales, which
substantially decreases the possibility that those profits
would be reinvested into the Iraqi economy.

The Iraqi

government would not have control over oil company
operations inside Iraq, and any disputes would be referred
to international arbitration panels.

Additionally, no

contracts would be public documents and contracting
companies would not be obliged to hire Iraqi workers

(Schwartz 2007).
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Privatization of the Iraqi oil industry through the
use of production-sharing agreements clearly serves the

interests of foreign companies over those of Iraq,
particularly those of American and British companies, as
these two western powers hold the most influence over Iraqi

governing decisions in their role as the leading occupying

nations in Iraq.

Western companies such as BP, Shell,

Exxon, and Chevron, as well as smaller companies such as

Addax Petroleum are in positions to gain the most from the
passage of a law allowing production-sharing agreements.
John Heavyside, business manager for BP in Iraq stated his

support for PSAs saying,
.

.

.We want to take risks and get incentivised

to perform better; service contracts don't really
allow us to do that.

It's what we all want, all

the international companies here.

Production

sharing agreements offer a win-win situation.

They are equitable and offer lucrative returns

and benefits to both the state and investing
companies.

(Jasiewicz 2007)

To this Natiq al Bayati, director or reservoir and oil
fields development in the Iraq oil ministry, replied,
"International oil companies would prefer the PSC
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[production-sharing contract] but the political and
economic culture and atmosphere in Iraq is not conducive to
this contract" (Jasiewicz 2007).

The political and economic

culture in Iraq is not open to the PSAs most likely due to
the years of sovereignty denied to them by western

companies who had the backing of their governments during
the era of concession contracts in the oil industry

Foreign oil companies see the potential for profits in
Iraq since their production capacity has not been met for

years due to the disruptive effects of the Iran-Iraq War in
the 1980's, the years of UN economic sanctions following
the Gulf War in 1991, and the infrastructure and political

environment still needing to be rebuilt after the 2003

invasion.

According to the U.S. Energy Information

Administration, Iraq possesses 115 billion barrels of
proven oil reserves, the third largest in the world after

Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Only about 10% of the country has

actually been explored and there is reason to believe that

with the introduction of more modern methods that have not
been in effect in Iraq for many years, more oil could be

discovered.

A modest goal for Iraq's oil industry is 3.5

million barrels per day; however from 1990 until the 2003
invasion, Iraq averaged around 2.5 million barrels per day.
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An increase to the 3.5 million barrels per day level at the
$30 per barrel price oil was getting prior to the invasion,

created projected revenues at $40 billion per year
(Schwartz 2007).

With the introduction of large foreign

oil companies contributing to the exploration and

production efforts in Iraqi oil, these numbers are
projected to grow even more.
To attract the large amounts of finance capital needed

to restore and increase Iraqi oil production (somewhere in
the range of $20 billion has been estimated) will be

difficult to do as long as the security and stability in
Iraq remains precarious.

Therefore, the advocates of the

PSAs in Iraq have been able to make an argument to justify
their use stating that favorable PSAs are the only way to

attract this level of investment under the current
dangerous conditions.

Due to the current conditions, few

companies are willing to invest in Iraq; however, some have
argued that if order is restored Iraq would have no problem
attracting large amounts of finance capital to develop
reserves that could be in excess of $10 trillion, therefore

nullifying the need for PSAs (Schwartz 2007).

Based on

leaked information to the media from the petrochemical law
under consideration, journalists have reported that the law
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contains extremely favorable provisions for oil companies,
in which they would be entitled to 70 percent of profits

until development expenses were amortized and 20 percent
thereafter.

This would guarantee them at least twice the

typical profit margin over the term of the contract
(Schwartz 2007) .

There is a lot of pressure being placed on the Iraqi

government to pass this Hydrocarbon privatization law.
That pressure is coming from several sources including

international oil companies, studies and recommendations

from the British government, the U.S. occupation, and IMF
reform mandates.

In 2004, BP, Chevron, Exxon, Total and

ENI employed the services of Washington-based lobbyists the
International Tax and Investment Centre.

The ITIC produced

a document which concluded that PSAs were the only

investment option for Iraq (Jasiewicz 2007).

The Foreign

Office on behalf of the British government delivered the

ITIC report to Iraqi officials.

The British ambassador to

Iraq formally sent the "road-map" study on the Iraqi oil

industry to the then Iraqi minister of finance, which

recommended the Iraqi government sign long-term production
sharing agreements with foreign oil companies (Webb 2007).
Because Iraq is still under U.S. occupation, with the

77

presence of U.S. and multinational troops and private

security contractors as a reminder, pressure is placed on
the Iraqi government to ensure the success of the Western

backed oil plans.

Because the U.S. military would be

needed to protect U.S. corporate interests, especially in

oilfields leased to U.S. companies by a compliant Iraqi

government, troop presence in the form of permanent
military bases would be the guardian of U.S. corporate

interests in the Iraq for the life of the contracts, over
the next twenty-five to thirty-years.

Additionally, the

International Monetary Fund is pressuring the Iraq to adopt
the program when the IMF was made a key player in Iraqi oil
policy.

Through loans in the 1980s and reparations for

his invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Saddam

accumulated $120 billion in external debt, the
largest per capita debt in the world and a
potentially insurmountable obstacle to economic
recovery, even in oil-rich Iraq.

One option

available to the new government was to declare

this debt 'odious', a technical term in
international law referring to debt accumulated
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by authoritarian rulers for their own personal or
political aggrandizement.

(Schwartz 2007)

The IMF made the approval of the oil law one of the main

conditions for reducing the Iraqi international debts, as
declared on December 1, 2005 in the Paris meeting between

the IMF and representatives of the Iraqi government

(Chalabi 2007).

Shortly thereafter, the U.S. began to

pressure the Iraqi government to draft the Hydrocarbon law
that would conform to the IMF guidelines, including the use

of Profit-Sharing Agreements and other provisions that

would open the Iraqi economy, and the oil sector in

particular, to investment by multinational corporations.

Prior to the introduction of the privatization law

with the PSA provisions, Iraq had 45 competitive memoranda
of understanding with oil companies, confirmed pre-

contractual commitments to work together on particular
projects. The oil ministry had also confirmed work on model

deals and regulations, including more than 100 blocks up
for exploration, 40 in the Kurdish region and 65 in the

rest of Iraq. Abdul Ilah Qassim al-Amir, oil adviser to the
Iraqi prime minister, also stated that contracts signed
under the previous regime would be reviewed. In this
category are the Al Ahdab field for the China Petroleum
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Company; Exploration Block 8 for India's ONGC Videsh; the

Amara field for Petro Vietnam; Block 3 for Indonesia’s

Petro-mina; and the Al Noor field for the Syrian government
(Jasiewicz 2007).

If oil companies from nations other than

the U.S. and Britain are willing to contract with Iraq for

development of their oil industry without the use of

production-sharing agreements, this threatens the ability
of western companies to obtain the more favorable PSA
contracts in any legislation passed by the Iraqi government

regarding oil, therefore losing their ability to dominate
and influence the oil industry in the region once again.

Foreign corporations are threatening U.S. supremacy in
Iran, as well, as they ignore U.S. sanctions rules which

prohibit investment in the Iranian energy sector.

Because

U.S. corporations are banned by U.S. sanctions from

investing in Iranian energy, the U-. S. is threatened with
the loss of supremacy in the region it is fighting to
maintain.

The United States has threatened to punish

foreign firms that do business in Iran, under the IranLibya Sanctions Act of 1996, but this has not deterred many
large foreign companies from seeking access to Iran's

reserves.

According to the Department of Energy (DoE),

Iran supplied 14% of China's oil imports in 2003.
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In

October 2004, Iran signed a $100 billion, 25-year contract
with Sinopec, a major Chinese energy firm, for joint
development of one of its major gas fields and the

subsequent delivery of LNG to China.

In the year 2000, the

French company TotalFina/Elf wrapped up a $2 billion deal
to develop the South Pars oil and gas fields.

In 2000,

Royal Dutch/Shell signed an $800 million contract to
develop the Soroush and Nowrooz offshore oilfield, In late

2001 and early 2002, Shell brought part of the $1.1 billion
Soroush-Nowrooz development online, and a consortium of

three Japanese companies bought a 20 percent share in the
Soroush-Nowrooz project.

share in the Balal fields.

ENI-Agip acquired a 38 percent
Norway's Statoil signed a

series of agreements with the National Iranian Oil Company

to explore for oil in the Strait of Hormuz.

Russia's

Lukoil indicated that it had received approval to prospect

along the border with Iraq in September 2003.
From 1995 to mid-1999, Iran attracted about $5 billion
of investment in the form of joint ventures and buyback
contracts in the oil and gas companies, and according to
the Middle East Economic Digest, the country is expected to

lure an additional $20 billion to its petrochemicals

industry by 2013 (Valibeigi 2004).
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As non-American oil

companies penetrate the Iranian market, there are

significant economic losses to the U.S. because of the lack
of bilateral trade.

The continuation of sanctions will

ultimately serve to be a disadvantage to the U.S., in terms
economic losses, and the weakening of relations with those

nations who are choosing to move forward with investments
and trade with Iran.
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CHAPTER FIVE
COMPARING BRITISH AND UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT

IN THE MIDDLE EAST: RESULTING POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC STRUCTURES IN IRAQ

The British during the mandate period fought and the

U.S. in its current occupation are fighting, desperately to
retain influence in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq,
for their own economic and security needs.

The British

during the mandate period from 1914 to 1932, due to a lack
of finances, domestic support, and soldiers were forced to
rely on high levels of violence and patronage to keep the

population from rising up and unseating them and were
forced to leave much sooner than originally anticipated.

Resources were channeled through indigenous Iraqis the
British believed to have social influence in the hope that
they could guarantee social order at the lowest possible
cost.

These decisions by the British government resulted

in an independent Iraqi state that was built on shallow

social foundations.

The United States faces similar issues

in. Congress presently about expenditure for the war and

occupation, as well as the American public's growing
concern and discontent with the occupation in Iraq.
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Now

the post-Saddaam Iraqi government is struggling to rebuild

a stable political and economic structure for themselves.
The British recognized that they could not afford to

govern Iraq directly as a colony, and they found a less

overt system by using English advisers behind an Arab
fagade, which was more economical.

On October 21, 1920,

the newly arrived civil commissioner, Sir Percy Cox,

announced the formation of a provisional government under

Arab ministers with British advisers.

At Cairo, in March

1921, Winston Churchill met with senior British advisers
and worked out the administrative arrangements that were to

endure for the next forty years.

Recognizing the need to

cut expenditures, and the fact that the mandate was

unpopular in Iraq, Churchill decided to negotiate a treaty

with Iraq which would both end the mandate and give Iraq a

degree of nominal independence.

The British also

recognized, however, that Britain's position in Iraq
depended largely upon the ruler selected, and therefore

they imported Sharif Faisal, the former king of Syria, and
worked out a program to ensure his election in the

forthcoming referendum.

"Popular" support was mobilized

and his only serious opponent was arrested and deported on
vague charges of sedition.

Faisal arrived in Iraq in June
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1921 and was declared king on July 11, 1921 (Polk 1969, p.

126-127).
State building of the nature being attempted in Iraq
by the U.S and its allies following the 2003 invasion, and

formerly attempted by the British during the mandate period
following World War I, is based upon the historic

experience of Western Europe, "where state institutions
evolved out of the societies they came to rule over in a

violent competition for survival with their territorial

rivals" (Dodge 2003, p. xxiv-xxv).

State building in Iraq

by the British in the 1920's and the U.S. presently, is

very different from this model as, "it concerns the

creation of state capacity by external powers, in coalition,
with a section of the indigenous population it has selected

as its ally" (Dodge 2003, p. xxv).

The Weberian model of

the state foreign western powers have attempted to

implement can be defined as being,
.

.

. legitimized by its ability to deliver

public goods to the population contained within
its recognized borders through a differentiated
set of centralized governmental institutions.

Crucial to its ability to perform these tasks is
the veracity of its claim to 'binding authority'
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over its citizenship and ultimately 'over all
actions taking place in the area of its

jurisdiction.'

A state's capacity for rule is

ultimately grounded in the extent to which its
'administrative staff successfully upholds the
claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of
physical force in the enforcement of its order.'

The degree to which a state has reached this
ideal type can be judged by the ability of its

institutions to impose and guarantee the rule of
law, penetrate society, mobilize the population,
and extract resources.

Ultimately, the

sustainability of state capacity is anchored into

the extent to which its actions are judged to be

legitimate in the eyes of its citizens." (Dodge
2003, p. xxiv)
Unfortunately, the Iraqi state does not so easily fit this

model or ideal type.

The state that was created in the

aftermath of World War I that existed until the removal of
Saddam Hussein has been dominated by four interlinked

structural problems, as identified by Toby Dodge.
These are: first, the deployment of extreme

levels of organized violence by the state to
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dominate and shape society; second, the use of
state resources- jobs, development aid, and

patronage- to buy loyalty of sections of society;

third, the use of oil revenue by the state to
increase its autonomy from society; and, finally,

the exacerbation and re-creation by the state of
communal and ethnic divisions as strategy of

rule.

(Dodge 2003, p. 169)

All of these factors have contributed to the population's,

view of the state as being illegitimate as well as to the

lack of democratic rule.
As industry and commodity export became more developed
in the Middle East, a tendency that became more and more
common was the creation of the "rentier state" and the

consolidation of state structures after colonization in the
regions where territorial boundaries had been drawn before
internal state-building occurred.

In a rentier state, the

"state is reliant not on an extraction of the domestic
population's surplus production but on externally generated

revenues, or rents, such as those derived from oil" (Kuru
2002).

The economy is dominated by incomes derived from

rents, and the rentiers, or recipients of the rents, wield
considerable political influence. The rentiers within the
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periphery nation live on the proceeds of capital export,
thus the productive growth of the economy is limited

because the income from the commodity export is distributed

amongst the population in various ways.

This serves to

limit participation by the local population in the growth
of the economy while allowing them to reap the benefits of

the revenue.

The core nations encourage the continuation

of the rentier economy because they benefit from the

dependency the rentier state has on a single commodity
export, such as oil.

The rentier state does not engage in

large-scale industrial development because the revenues
received from the oil are sufficient, therefore, they do
not gain power as a capitalist competitor to core nations.

The dependency of the core industrial nations on the oil

resource results in demands and pressures being made on the

rentier state by the core nation's firms and government to
provide the oil at a desirable price.

The rentier state

financially depends on international capital inflow.

The

revenues received by the state eliminate the need for
domestic taxation, as the wealth generated precludes the

need to extract income from the citizenry.

Since the

people are not taxed they are therefore not given a say in
the expenditure of the money, resulting in a lack of
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democracy.

The less democratic a government, through the

oppression of organized opposition, the more easily an
imperial nation can manipulate the policies of the rentier

state to its own economic and political agenda.

This is

common in the imperialism of recent times (Kuru 2002).
The existence of a rentier economy in Iraq, as well as

several other Middle Eastern states including Iran, Saudi
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar, is one

theory advanced to explain the predominance of

authoritarian regimes and the apparent lack of democracy in
the region.

Iraq before the 2003 U.S. invasion, and to a

large extent today, is experiencing the effects of the
rentier economy through various government subsidies to the

population for food products, oil, gasoline, fertilizers
and pesticides.

Fuel subsidies cost around $8 billion per

year, with Iraq importing between $200 and $250 million

worth of fuel per month (Herring and Rangwala 2006, p.

215).

Many Iraqi citizens believe they are entitled to

heavily subsidized fuel as citizens of an oil-rich country

(Herring and Rangwala 2006, p. 223).

Therefore, their

dependence upon and loyalty to the providers of such
subsidies outweighs their desire or ability to change the

political structure through the democratic process/

89

There

is also little push for the development of a strong
domestic productive sector therefore limiting employment
opportunities or the ability for real economic growth to

occur.
Paul Bremer during the period of the Coalition

Provisional Authority (CPA) declared that "subsidy

elimination was more important than privatization" because
"liberalizing prices is a necessary measure on the way to

marketization" (Herring and Rangwa'la 2006, p. 222).

However, without first establishing a legitimate,
sovereign, popularly elected government capable of making
its own choices about the future of Iraq's economy, the

U.S. led plans for Iraq was to open the Iraqi economy and

transform it into the U.S. version of the neoliberal model.
To do this, the initial focus of the CPA was to end the
Iraqi state's protectionism and domination of the economy,

essentially its role as the rentier.

The CPA then imposed

cuts in subsidies on food imports, fertilizers, and
pesticides, which only served to reinforce Iraq's

dependency on food imports and aggravated the already

burgeoning problems of unemployment and poverty.

"The food

rationing system in Iraq costs about $5 billion per year,
about 25% of Iraqi government revenue" (Herring and
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Rangwala 2006, p. 222).

And while this does undermine

incentives for local food production, it also happens to be
the primary source of nutrition for about 60% of the

population, and 10% of the population need food supplies in
addition to the ration (Herring and Rangwala 2006, p. 222).
While there is a general agreement that Iraq needs to move

away from the rationing and subsidy system in order to
pursue real economic growth and become less of a rentier

state, how to do this is the important question.

To have

the U.S. led policies defining the path for the Iraqi

government to take while keeping its own interests ahead of
those of the emerging Iraqi state will not ultimately lead

to a citizenry participating more in its government, more
democracy, stability, or economic growth for Iraq.

The U.S., as the leader of "the coalition" and the

dominant economic and military power in the world today, is
able to dictate the outcome of the state-building process

in Iraq, and utilizes foreign policy and its military to
maintain control over those areas it deems necessary for
its own economic and security needs.

The Coalition

government was in a position of considerable political

vulnerability within Iraq, given its status as a foreign
occupying power.

If a national political challenger to it
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were to have been allowed to emerge and win popular
legitimacy, the Coalition's ability to maintain control

would have been highly limited.

Thus a considerable part

of the Coalition's work within Iraq was to prevent the
emergence of such a challenger, while at the same time
retaining an approach that was seen to favor political

progress (Herring and Rangwala 2006, p. 13-14).

In doing

so, this limits Iraq's ability to create a legitimate
government entity and pursue economic growth on its own

terms by eliminating any arguments from Iraqis for

achieving national self-determination through the pursuit
of a dialogue or objection to the Coalition's policies.
The U.S. policy for post-invasion Iraq has not been
the unfolding of predetermined plan or the gradual

achievement of specific goals.

Instead, the very nature of that project has
shifted rapidly and the way success has been

defined has changed simultaneously: liberation,

social and economic transformation, restoring

Iraqi sovereignty, democratization, military
self-sufficiency and avoiding sectarian conflict

have all functioned as the major objective for
the US at some point during the [five] years
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since the invasion, and the tensions between
these goals have led to a stuttering, often
incoherent, political strategy.

(Herring and

Rangwala 2006, p. 47)

Because the U.S. did not have a clear workable plan based
on the realities of the situation in Iraq created in the
post-invasion period, it has been forced to act in reaction
to developments in Iraq, and in response to domestic

political dynamics back in the U.S.
One of the major policy objectives for the U.S. in
Iraq was to gain permanent military bases there as part of
the overall expansion of military presence in the region in
order to have better control over access to resources it

desired, namely oil and pipeline routes.

In a report

entitled Rebuilding America's Defenses, published in

September 2000, the PNAC emphasized the centrality to US
strategic interests of developing US military bases in the

Middle East regardless of any dispute with Iraq or Iran:

[T]he US has for decades sought to play a more
permanent role in the Gulf regional security.

While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides

immediate justification, the need for a
substantial American force presence in the Gulf
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transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam

Hussein.

.

.[E]ven should the US-Iranian

relations improve, retaining forward-based forces

in the region would still be an essential element
in US security strategy given the longstanding
American interests in the region.

(Herring and

Rangwala 2006, p. 10)
If Iraq were able to develop and maintain a stable,

democratic, legitimate form of government the need for and

justification of a large U.S. military presence would be
highly compromised.
For a legitimate political center to have developed in

Iraq there would have to have been continual negotiation
over and challenge to the Coalition's presence and its
plans for Iraq during transition and afterwards.

However,

the Coalition needed to continue to hold the keys to

political authority in order for the U.S. military to
preserve their security as they saw fit, a feature that

remains a key requirement of the U.S. armed forces for
perceived political and strategic reasons (Herring and

Rangwala 2006, p. 82).

Therefore, the U.S. needed to

manage and balance the competing Iraqi political processes
in order to maintain its unofficial retention of state
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power, particularly give the hostility of most of Iraq's

population to a continued role for the Coalition military
inside Iraq.

Thus, in order to retain its pre-eminence

within Iraq, the Coalition had to forestall the creation of

an autonomous rival center of political power.

So while

the U.S. knew that it must acknowledge the legitimacy of
the Shi'a claim for power, through acceding to the demand

for elections that would translate a numerical majority
into political superiority, the U.S. also sought to ensure
that this superiority would not seriously threaten U.S.

autonomy in decision-making (Herring and Rangwala 2006, p.
83).

The U.S. accomplished this through continued

oversight by the U.S. on the IGC, the Coalition overruling
and marginalizing Iraqi officials who sought to act as

autonomous decision-makers, and the limiting of the

authority of the central government through balancing its
power with that of regional actors.

The U.S. actions were

not following a dispersal of power through an integrated

hierarchy, but encouraging fragmented power.
There was a significant turn towards the use of

tribal shaykhs, who became an alternative power
base of the Coalition.

This was not a new

strategy for Iraq: under the League of Nations
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mandate, the British administrators had used

tribal leaders... as rivals to the monarch, as a

method of limiting Faysal I's ability to campaign

against the continuation of the mandate.

(Herring

and Rangwala 2006, p. 87-88)
Thus U.S. actions, just as British actions in a previous

imperialist era, were driven by the desire to maintain

control in Iraq.
The U.S. has feared that even those actors who
have been prepared to work with the occupation

might take Iraq in directions inimical to
perceived U.S. interests.

In this context, the

U.S. decided to try to retain possession of the
key levers of state power and to limit the
emergence of a coherent Iraqi state until it
could ensure that the state would be safe for

U.S. interests.

(Herring and Rangwala 2006, p.

94)
Due to the policies pursued by western capitalist

powers, namely Britain and the United States, in the Middle

East since the early 20th Century because of the abundance
of petroleum resources in the region and the profits to be
gained via control of this industry, the states of the
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region have largely not developed into democratic free-

market states.

Most states in the Middle East do not have

democratic governments, and continue to rely upon state

revenues generated by the oil industry to support the
majority of the population.

The post-World War I mandate

system, which was supposed to have guided the development

of democratic states in the newly created countries
following the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, instead had
its policies dictated by British and other European powers,

desire to maintain control over the oil industry there and

to ensure optimal conditions for its oil companies to

operate.

The United States too has pursued policies in the

region for similar ends.

The U.S. today continues to seek

favorable conditions in the economies of the Middle Eastern
states for the profits of its oil companies and to maintain
a presence there in order to create conditions optimal for
the operation of these companies to maximize profits.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION

The history of western involvement in the Middle East

shows that the nature of these relationships over the past
century has been imperialist in nature, with the western
nations being the primary beneficiaries of the
relationships.

There remains a class of people within the

Middle Eastern nations that benefit too from the political
and economic structure of the relationship and serve to

perpetuate the continuation of relations with the core in a
way that limits the growth of both a free market economy
and more democratic political structures in the periphery

nations.

Iraq serves as a primary example of this through

both its relations with Britain during the mandate period
and the United States since 2003.

The continuing

dependence of the Iraqi people on the state for many of
their basic needs in the absence of a fully democratic

political environment shows this.
The British in the mandate period and the U.S. today

both have similar economic motivations for their
involvement in the Middle East, which is the desire to

exercise control over the oil industry and benefit from oil
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revenues. The rhetoric of bringing democracy and stability
to the region has served in both cases as a rationale for

continued involvement in the region.

However, should a

truly democratic political structure become powerful enough
to assert the interests of the Iraqi people they may

actually enact policies antithetical to western interests,

particularly with regards to the oil industry.
This paper shows that imperialism is still a relevant

theory as defined by Marxist theorists, particularly Harry

Magdoff.

The similarities between British policies and

actions in the Middle East during the mandate period and
U.S. policies and actions following World War II leading up

to the 2003 invasion of Iraq remind us that the

continuation of policy making with similar political and
economic motivations, essentially to benefit the economic
and military interests of the West, will continue to evoke
similar outcomes.

The Middle Eastern nations will continue

to lack the political structures able to experience real

economic growth and lack democratic structures able to
provide for a strong, stable society able to assert their
own interests in relations with more powerful Western

nations.
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